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THE POLITICAL ACT: ITS APPLICATION TO
ANNEXATION, THIRD PARTY ATTACK,
AND CORPORATE AUTHORITY
Prior to an attempted annexation by Brown Deer and an attempted
consolidation by the city of Milwaukee, Granville was an unincorporated
area located in Milwaukee County. In 1956, Brown Deer, by adopting
a number of ordinances, purported to annex part of Granville. In the
same year Milwaukee adopted an ordinance purporting to annex a portion of Granville which was included in Brown Deer's annexation.
During the same year Granville and Milwaukee adopted consolidation
ordinances which were subsequently approved by referendum. A controversy arose concerning the validity of the annexation ordinances and
the consolidation ordinance. The problem was brought before the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin on two occasions prior.to a trial of the
issues. Upon the first appeal, it was determined that Brown Deer's annexations of the territories in Granville took precedence over Mihvaukee's consolidation with Granville. It was determined that if Brown
Deer's annexation ordinances were valid the territories involved would
become part of Brown Deer.1 Pursuant to the order of the supreme
court upon the second appeal, the trial court entered summary judgement that the consolidation ordinances of Milwaukee and Granville
2
were valid.
After the decision on the second appeal, the matter proceeded to
trial where it was decided, in light of the two preceding decisions of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, that three out of the five Brown Deer
annexation ordinances were invalid. An appeal was thereafter perfected
bringing to the supreme court the issue of the validity of those ordinances. The invalidity of the ordinances was upheld by a determination
3
that they did not comply with §62.07(1) (a).
The reason given was that
the petition presented to the council pursuant to the enactment of the
ordinances did not contain the signatures of ". . . a majority of the
electors in such adjacent territory and by the owners of one-half of
1 Village of Brown Deer v. City of Milwaukee, 274 Wis. 50, 79 N.W.2d 340

(1956).
2Village of Brown Deer v. City of Milwaukee, 2 Wis.2d 441, 86 N.W.2d 487
(1957).
3Wis. STAT. §62.07(1) (a) (1955), "(1) Annexation procedure. Territory adjacent to any city may be annexed to such city in the manner following: (a)
A petition therefore shall be presented to the council. 1. signed by a majority
of the electors in such adjacent territory and by the owners of one-half

of the real estate within the limits of the territory proposed to be annexed.

or 2, if no electors reside in the said adjacent territory signed by the owners
of one-half of the taxable property therein according to the last tax roll, or
3, by a majority of the electors and the owners of one-half of the real estate

in assessed value; provided, that no petition for annexation shall be valid

unless at least 10 days and not more than 20 days before any such petition

is caused to be circulated, a notice shall be posted in at least 8 public places
in the municipality."
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the real estate within the limits of the territory proposed to be annexed ......

The issues to be discussed in this article will be confined to one of
the ordinances, namely, the Corrigan Annexation, since what is said
by the court in respect thereto is applicable to the remaining ordinances.
The Corrigan Annexation petition contained the signature of the president of the Evert Container Corporation who signed the petition for
the corporate property included within the area of the annexation attempt. The president of the corporation signed the petition without formal authorization of the board of directors as provided by §180.301 and
without informal authorization as provided by §180.91. 5 The supreme
court found that the president owned 51 per cent of the stock, that he
was accustomed to resolving the problems of the corporation as sole
owner, that the board of directors met infrequently, that the corporation subsequently ratified the act, and that, in spite of this, his act was
outside the bounds of the statute and therefore was invalid. The court
based its decision upon two grounds: (1) that the enactment of §180.91
(supra) pre-empts the field and prohibits corporations from acting informally, 6 and (2) that the doctrines of apparent authority and estoppel
cannot apply because the action of the president in the present case
related to a "political act". The court also used the phrase "political act"
in dispelling the contention of the appellant, Brown Deer, that because
the respondent, City of Milwaukee, is a third party it lacked standing to
challenge the authority of the corporate president. The court reasoned
that since the act of signing was a "political act", the ".

.

. other inter-

ested parties may be heard to challenge the validity thereof." The practical effect of invalidating the signature was to invalidate the ordinances,
because without the representation of the corporate property the petition
was not signed ".

.

. by a majority of the electors and the owners of

one-half of the real estate in assessed value."9
The decision raises a number of perplexing issues, the answers to
which appear to be left to speculation. First, by their construction of
4Wis. STAT. §180.30 (1955): "The business and affairs of a corporation shall

be managed by a board of directors .. "
STAT. §180.91 (1955) : "Any action required by the articles of incorporation or by-laws of any corporation or any provision of law to be taken at
a meeting or any other action which may be taken ,at a meeting, may be
taken without a meeting if a consent in writing setting forth the action so
taken shall be signed by all of the shareholders, subscribers, directors or
members of a committee thereof entitled to vote with respect to the subject
matter thereof. Such consent shall have the same force and effect as a
unanimous vote, and may be stated as such in any articles or document filed
with the secretary of state under this chapter."
6 Village of Brown Deer v. City of Milwaukee, 16 Wis.2d 206, 114 N.W.2d 493
(1962).
7Supra note 4.

5Wis.

s Ibid.

9Supra note 3.
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§180.91,10 does the court abrogate entirely the doctrine of apparent
authority as heretofore applied in regard to the power of the president
to act for a corporation? Second, is the state of the law changed in Wisconsin as to the validity of a third party attack upon the authority of a
corporate officer to act for a corporation? Third, what is a "political act"
and when and how does it determine corporate conduct? Fourth, what
are the practical aspects of the court's determination with respect to
corporate practice?
I. THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT OF A CORPORATION TO ACT

The principle case seems to abrogate the doctrine of apparent authority as heretofore established in the law of Wisconsin. The president of
the Evert Container Corporation, the corporation whose property was
contained within the proposed Corrigan annexation, owned more than
half of the stock of that corporation and was accustomed to acting as
sole owner in regard to corporate matters, and the board of directors,
which met infrequently, was accustomed to ratifying his past acts. Under these established facts, the president signed the annexation petition,
without either formal or informal authorization by the board of directors; this act was later ratified at a meeting of the board of directors.
It would seem that the act of the president in signing the annexation
petition would fall under the rule of McElroy vs. Minnesota Percheron
Horse Co."1 which holds that:
A corporation may so conduct its affairs as to confer by implication, upon its president, powers much beyond those strictly incident to his office, even to the extent of exercising the entire
powers of the corporation, which, by the articles, are vested
solely in the board of directors. The powers of the president of a
corporation or any other officer thereof, do not depend solely
upon the title of the office or the actual delegation of power, but
upon the appearances with which the officer is clothed by the corporation; that is to say, it is the apparent power of the officer,
not the actually delegated power, which governs. The law is well
settled that, within the scope of his apparent power, the president
of a corporation, by his acts, binds such corporation the same as
if he were the agent of a natural person.
The court recognizes the general rule that power to manage corporate affairs is vested in the board of directors and as such must be exercised by them as a board,'1 2 but the court apparently does not recognize the exception or extension or that rule as set out in the McElroy
decision.
It could be further stated that if the presisdent acts as general manager of the corporation, he possesses the implied power to do anything
10 Supra note 5.
11 McElroy v. Minnesota Perceron Horse Co., 96 Wis. 317, 71 N.W. 652 (1897).
122 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATION §392, at 277 (1958).
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the corporation could do within the general scope of its business,' 3 and
that ".

.

. corporations have the implied power to make all such con-

tracts as will further the objects of their creation."'14 It would then
seem logical to state that due to the mode of operation of the corporation, the president was its general agent and as such had the power to
sign the petition on behalf of the corporation since the corporation itself had the power to sign the petition.
Another doctrine well established in the law of Wisconsin is the
ratification of corporate acts where the requisite authority of the president was lacking at the time of execution of the act in question. This
doctrine is set out in the case of Moody & Meckelburg Co. vs. Trustees
of Methodist Episcopal Church:15
A corporation may ratify the unauthorized act of one claiming
to act as its agent, as well as a natural person, and such ratification, when made with knowledge of the facts, operates as though
previous authority had been given.
Ratification binds the corporate act of an agent who exceeds his powers
in acting for the corporation.'16 The ratification need not be formally
enacted to validate a corporate act of an agent who exceeds his powers.
The mere knowledge on the part of the board of directors will be deemed
sufficient to constitute a ratification and validate the act as of the time
it was performed."
Assuming that the president of the Evert Container Corporation
had neither the actual authority nor the apparent authority to sign the
petition, it would appear that the act was a valid exercise of the president's power at the time of performance in light of the mode of operation of the corporation and the later actual ratification of the act by the
board of directors. Under either doctrine the court would have been
justified in concluding that the signature was valid.
The court, however, side stepped these arguments on two grounds,
first that:
The legislature has said that the corporation could act informally,
without a meeting, by obtaining the consent in writing of all of
the Directors. In (their) opinion, this pronouncement has pre13 Diederich v. Wisconsin Wood Products Inc., 247 Wis. 212, 19 N.W.2d 268
(1945).
14 May Tire & Service, Inc. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 240 Wis. 260, 3 N.W.2d
347 (1942).
15Moody & Meckelburg Co. v. Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Church, 99
Wis. 49, 74 N.W. 572 (1898).
16 Supra note 13.
17State ex rel. Kropf v. Gilbert, 213 Wis. 196, 251 N.W. 478 (1933) ; "... knowledge on the part of the board of directors of acts performed by corporate
officers is sufficient to constitute a ratification of such acts," is the language
approved in May Tire & Service, Inc. v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra note 14,
at 264, 3 N.W.2d at 350.
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empted the field and prohibits corporations from acting informally without complying with sec. 180.91, Stats.
and second that:
The presence of apparent authority ... cannot apply where the
action of the directors relates to a political determination and is
outside of the ordinary course of normal business operations.,'
The first ground will be discussed here, and the second under topic III.
The historical background of §180.91 implies that it was enacted to
implement the field of an agentes authority and not to restrict it. The
object of the legislation was to permit informal unanimous action even
though the articles of incorporation or the by-laws provided only for
action at a meeting. In other words, the purpose of the enactment was
not to preempt the field of informal action by corporate agents but to
allow informal action where such action was not allowed by the articles
or by-laws of the corporation.' Such an interpretation would be more
in keeping with the present trend of business activity and the realization that legitimate business operations should be promoted rather than
restricted.2 0 In further support of this realization, the courts have raised
a presumption in favor of the authority of the officer who signs in behalf of the corporation. 2 1 The Wisconsin court has also promulgated
the theory that since the business of a corporation is committed to its
officers and directors, their actions which are consistent with the exercise of honest discretion should not be overruled. 22 It has also been said
that:
As industrial conditions change, business methods must change
with them, and acts become permissible which at an earlier period
23
would not have been considered to be within corporate power.
Is Supra note 6.
19 Ibid.

20

Milwaukee Trust Co. v. VanValkenburgh, 132 Wis. 638, 646, 112 N.W. 1083,
1085 (1907), "The law, especially so far as it is competent for courts, unrestrained by legislative enactments, to declare and administer it, prpmotes
rather than obstructs legitimate business operations. If it were not as indi-

cated, the modern methods of doing almost all kinds of business through

artificial persons would be very prejudicially handicapped." See also Curtis
Land & Loan Co. v. Interior Land Co., 137 Wis. 341, 118 N.W. 853 (1908)
and St. Clair v. Rutledge, 115 Wis. 583, 92 N.W. 234 (1902).
21Milwaukee Trust Co. v. VanValkenburgh, supra note 20; St. Clair v. Rut-

ledge, supra note 20; Ceeded v. H. M. Load & Sons Lumber Co., 86 Mich.

541, 49 N.W. 575 (1891); Kalamazoo T. P., Kalamazoo Cty. v. City of
Phoenix, 83 Ariz. 98, 317 P.2d 537 (1957).
Roberts v. Saukville Canning Co., 250 Wis. 112, 124, 26 N.W2d 145, 150
(1947), ". . . it is important to remember that the business of a corporation
is committed to its officers and directors and their actions are not to be overruled if they are consistent with the exercise of honest discretion."
23Martin Orchard Co. v. Fruit Growers Canning Co., 203 Wis. 97, 233 N.W.
603 (1930), citing with approval, Theis v. Durr, 125 Wis. 651, 104 N.W. 985
(1905).
22
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The foregoing study would seem to indicate that the trend in this
jurisdiction, as well as elsewhere, has been to increase the scope of
authority possessed by the corporate agent rather than restrict it, and
to promote business enterprise through the expansion of such authority
rather than adopt stricter means and methods by which corporations
must act.
If the conclusion is now reached that corporate officers can not act
for the corporation under any volition of their own regardless of the
apparent authority they possess or regardless of the mode of operation
of the business or of the later ratification by the board of directors, the
doctrines of apparent authority and ratification in the law of Wisconsin
have been abrogated. However, somewhat a different interpretation of
§180.91 would protect the doctrine of ratification as established in this
jurisdiction and would'tend to follow the present trend in judicial
opinion by staying within the realities of corporate practice. This alternate determination is well stated by Justice Currie's dissent in the principle case:
The majority concludes that the only way informal corporate
action may legally be taken is by strict adherence to the provisions of 180.91, Stats. .

.

. A reasonable interpretation of this

statutory language permits the construction that the consent may
be signed after the action has been taken. Such a construction is
action and
more in keeping with the practicalities of corporate
24
with the realities of present corporate practice.
It will be remembered that in the principle case the president's act was
ratified so that this interpretation of the statute would not only be in
"keeping with the practicalities of corporate action" 25 but would preserve the doctrine of ratification and still accommodate the majority's
policy of strict adherence to the statutory mode of corporate action.
II. VALIDITY OF THIRD PARTY ATTACK

The appellants, Brown Deer, argued in the principle case that the
City of Milwaukee was a third party in regard to the action of the president of the Evert Container Corporation in signing the annexation petition and, as such, had no standing to challenge his authority to so sign.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court seemingly recognized the argument as
the law in Wisconsin, but made an exception in this case based on the
fact that here the act of signing the annexation petition was a "political
act"; hence, it was susceptible to attack by other interested parties. 2
Upon this premise it was logical for the court to deem the City of Milwaukee an interested party, for it was vitally concerned with the validity of the ordinances due to its own annexation and consolidation at4

25

Supra note 6.

Ibid.

26 Ibid.
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tempts. The majority of the court, speaking through Justice Gordon,
said:
However, we believe that when a corporation purports to perform a political act, as opposed to a business act, other interested
parties may be heard to challenge the validity thereof. Milwaukee
is a vitally interested third party.
and further that,
We conclude that an interested municipality may raise the question of the lack of authority of a person purporting to sign an
annexation petition on behalf of a corporation.27
The general rule prior to the decision in the principle case is well
stated by a recognized writer in the field,
As a general rule, if a corporation does not raise the objection
that an officer or other person assuming to enter into a contract
or do any other act on its behalf, and particularly if it has ratiof want of authority cannot be raised
fied the act, the 2objection
8
by third persons.

Moreover, as already stated the general rule is that only the
stockholders and the corporation, can question the validity of a
corporate act or instrument on the ground that the required consent of stockholders was not obtained or that the consent was not
because not given as provided for by the statute or
a valid 2one
9
charter.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in its prior decisions has voiced its
acceptance of this rule,30 and since the court does not overrule these
prior decisions, it can only be concluded that what the court said in the
principle case is an exception to the general rule and not a complete
overturning of prior case law. The wisdom of such an exception is left
to future determination. However, the decision on its face opens the
door to at least one type of third party attack heretofore prohibited.
The reasoning in the main case is capable of an interpretation which
would allow not only municipal corporations standing to attack the
authority of corporate executives to sign petitions but also individuals
who can show that they are a "vitally interested third party." The allowance of such third party attack would be a serious detriment to the
orderly conduct of corporate business. This is one possible way of expanding the exception set out in the main case-a possibility which
would logically follow. The extent to which the exception can be ex27 Supra note 6, at 212, 114 N.W.2d at 497.

28 2 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §490 (1958).
2 Supra note 6, at 222, 114 N.W.2d at 502, Justice Currie in his dissent stated,
"The apparent theory behind this rule is that the failure of the corporation
to object to an unauthorized act done in its behalf constitutes a tacit ratification, and that the policy of the law favors an interpretation which permits

parties to rely on acts taken in behalf of corporations."

30 Kennedy v. Knight, 21 Wis. 345 (1867), Germantown Farmer's Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Dhein, 43 Wis. 420 (1877).
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panded is too speculative for comment here, and the direction and substance of further expansion, if any, must be left to future court determination.
The court also justifies its decision upon the stated proposition that
the corporation did not comply with the statutory mode of corporate
action.31 Justice Currie, in his well reasoned dissent, states that,
Statutory requirements that a corporation must follow a certain
specified procedure, in authorizing action by its president, are
made for the protection of the corporation and its shareholders,
by a third party such as the City of
not as a sword to be used
32
Milwaukee in this action.
In other words, the statutory requirements were enacted so as to protect the corporation from the unauthorized actions of its agents. A corporation, having no physical existence, must be protected from the acts
of its agents in order to survive and prosper. However, once an act,
which when done is outside the scope of corporate authority but is
ratified, as in the instant case, the need for such protection vanishes,
for the ratified act has the effect of being passed on by the board of
directors or stockholders as the case may be, thus offering the corporation the same protection it would have received had the stockholders
acquiesed in the act in the first instance. The conclusion that the statutes
were not enacted for the use of third persons but for the protection of
the corporation appears, therefore, to be justified on the grounds of
logic and practicality.
These arguments become unnecessary if the court would interpret
§180.91 as allowing consent by the board of directors after the act in
question to act as a ratification and validate the corporate officer's act
as of the time of execution. Such a holding would not only eliminate
the possibility of extinguishment of the doctrine of ratification, but
would also eliminate in most instances the possibility of third party
attack, thus promoting rather than disrupting legitimate corporate enterprise.
III. POLITICAL

ACT OR DETERMINATION

The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Brown Deer case decided the
issues there presented upon the basic determination that the act of signing the annexation petition was a "political act" or "political determination." As a result of so deciding, the court stated that since the act of
signing was a "political act," vitally interested third parties had standing
to challenge the validity of the corporate act, 3 and that since the act
relates to a "political determination, ' '3 4 the doctrine of apparent author31 Supra notes 4 and 5.

32Supra note 6, at 223, 114 N.W2d at 502.
33 Supra note 6.
'4Ibid.
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ity does not apply. The problems previously discussed stem from this
basic determination. The terms "political act" and "political determination" though having the inherent susceptibility of different definitions
will be equated for the balance of this article, for it seems that the court
makes no distinction between them and for all practical purposes in
the context of the case they are synonomous.
Nowhere in the case is the term "political act" defined, nor is it
elaborated upon to any great extent. Certainly, it can be concluded that
henceforth the signing of an annexation petition will be deemed a political act. However, the court does not clarify the issue as to future corporate action. The court, in not defining or elaborating upon the subject, makes it difficult to determine the line of demarcation between a
political act on the one hand and a business act on the other. The importance, of such a distinction is vital, for when an act is defined as
political, third parties may question the authority of the acting corporate
officer, and also, the doctrine of apparent authority, if still existing in
the face of the Brown Deer decision, will not apply. The issue becomes
more perplexing because under the facts in the main case, there was no
finding that the decision to sign the petition was motivated by political
inclinations. Nor was it found that the decision of the corporation was
placed on political grounds. The decision could have been arrived at
solely on the basis of possible tax advantages, or because the municipality of Brown Deer offered better municipal services to the corporation, or because of some other purely business reason. The mere fact
that a government unit is concerned certainly cannot place the action
within the realm of political acts, because many corporate activities,
while involving some government unit, remain basically business decisions. Whether or not the decision is thus limited to annexation proceedings or also involves any or all actions by a corporation where a
governmental unit is involved must await further judicial determination. However, the sweep of the language suggests that the decision will
not be so limited.
The court in the context of its determination that the act performed
by the president of the Evert Corporation in signing the petition was a
political act and, therefore, outside the scope of business of the corporation stated that:
The signing of a petition which would change the local government under which the corporation functions is more closely analogous to such unusual acts of the corporation as the disposition
of its assets, as opposed to acts in the ordinary course of business.35
The analogy is an attempt by the court to place the case within the conceded rule that *extraordinaryacts such as the disposition of assets fall
35 Ibid.
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outside the ordinary scope of business of a corporation and, hence, must
be decided by a formal meeting of the board of directors. Such an
analogy was brought to the attention of the Arizona Court of Appeals
in argument upon an issue similar to the one here presented.3 6 The
annexation petition in that case was signed by the local manager of the
General Motors Corporation property located within the area to be
annexed. The manager had received his authority to sign from a vicepresident of the corporation. The statute of Arizona under which the
case was decided was similar to the Wisconsin statute.3 7 The court,
after disposing of the case on other grounds, stated in reply to the argument that signing an annexation petition is analogous to disposing of
corporate assets that:
Appellants seem to be under the impression that consenting to
become a part of a municipality is the equivalent of alienating
38
or encumbering property but we have held to the contrary.
The court further states in the Gorman case that if the authority of the
manager is not genuine, the company must object and not the thid
party. The decision of the Arizona court is in keeping with the argument that the decision to sign an annexation petition is not such an
extraordinary act as the disposition of assets but is more analogous to
an act within the scope of corporate affairs. An analogy could be drawn
between the decision to be annexed to Brown Deer rather than Milwaukee and the decision to physically move the plant to another locality
and/or into a different municipality. This analogy would seem to be
more practical than that which the court proposes.
The distinction that if a corporation is engaged in a "political act",
a third party has standing to challenge the authority of the officcr
through which the corporation acts is inconsistent with the proposition
that a corporation under the same circumstances cannot, in most instances, so challenge such lack of authority. If the consent of all the
stockholders of a corporation to a transaction is procured, they are precluded from subsequently objecting to the transaction on the ground that
it was invalid.3 9 Under the doctrine of ratification, if the board of directors has knowledge of the acts, the acts will be deemed valid as of
the time of execution, and the directors lack standing to object.4" If the
corporation has clothed the acting officer with the authority to act for
Gorman v. City of Phoenix, 76 Ariz. 35, 258 P.2d 424 (1953).
STAT. ANN. §16-701 (1939), "Any city may extend its corporate
limits in the manner folowing: On presentation of a petition in writing, signed
by the owners of not less than %2 in value of the property in any territory
continguous on the city...."
38 The Arizona court cites as authority, City of Phoenix v. State, 60 Ariz. 369,
137 P.2d 183 (1943).
39 Davies v. Meisinheimer, 254 Wis. 419, 37 N.W.2d 93 (1949).
40 May Tire & Service v. Sinclair Refining Co., 240 Wis. 260, 3 N.W.2d 347
(1942).
36

37

Asiz. REv.
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it in a particular business matter, and a third person has relied on such
apparent authority, the corporation cannot object, and it is bound by the
acts of the officer. 41 These rules are consistent with the rule that third
parties lack standing to question the acts of corporate officers and are
consistent with the general theory that ".

.

. the law favors an interpre-

tation which permits parties to rely on acts taken in behalf of corporations.

' 42

Seemingly, the distinction that the signing of an annexation

petition is a "political act" rather than a business act allows third parties
to attack the authority of the signature but does not change the law so
that the corporation, its board of directors, or its stockholders can
attack that same authority. This would appear to be inconsistent and
also in and of itself suggests an argument against such a distinction.
Even assuming that the act was political rather than business, it would
seem in the light of what has previously been said that the distinction
has no apparent basis and that the rationale ".

.

. of the general rule is

just as applicable to so-called political acts as it is to strict business
acts.

' 43

IV. THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION

The facts stated in the Brown Deer decision clearly established that
the corporation's general mode of operation was centered around the
practice of the president and majority stockholder to conduct the business of the corporation as its sole owner; all the decisions so made by
the president were ratified by the board of directors. To these facts
are added the circumstance that !he board of directors informaly acquiesed in the act prior to its execution and prior to their formal ratification. This mode of operation is a generally accepted procedure
where the corporation is small and closely owned since in the light of
practical experience the president and majority stockholder is, in most
cases, the driving force behind the corporation's success or failure and
thus controls the corporation as if he were the sole owner. It could be
further shown that the will of the majority stockholder and founder
in most cases is the will of the board of directors so that practically
speaking he is the board of directors. Whether or not this mode of
operation should be promoted or discouraged, the majority decision
seems to disregard these practical aspects and decides the case in favor
of strict adherence to their interpretation of the statutes involved. The
realities of present day corporate practice are thus disregarded in favor
of a procedure which adds form to corporate practice but does not
change the substance nor the end result. Under the particular fact situation here presented, it would seem beyond question that the same deDiederich v. Wisconsin Wood Products, 247 Wis. 212, 19 N.W.2d 268 (1945).
42 Supra note 6.
43 Ibid.
41

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

cision would have been reached whether or not there was a strict compliance with the statutory procedure.
In keeping with the realities of corporate practice, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has on previous occasions stated a rule which when applied in the context of such realities comes to a more logical conclusion.
This rule is well stated in Roberts vs. Saukville Canning Co.:
.. It is important to remember that the business of a corporation
is committed to its officers and directors and their actions are
not to be overruled if they are consistent with the exercise of
honest discretion. 4
If this concept had been applied in the main case, the mode of operation
and the practicalities of corporate practice could have been considered,
and the decision would have grounded itself on a more practical basis.
Another practical aspect of the decision in the instant case is that it
could have a tendency to disrupt orderly business procedures due to the
accepted fact that third parties will have standing to challenge the authority of corporate officers even where the corporation itself does not
challenge such authority.
Further, it would seem that the reliability heretofore placed upon
corporate acts will be impunged.4 5 Corporations and third parties will
have the added burden of establishing corporate authority in order to
place reliance upon the acts of corporate officers. This added burden is
unrealistic in view of prior case law development in the area. In St.
Clair vs. Rutledge it was stated:
As has often been said, intolerable mischief would result from
requiring every person at his peril, in dealing with the president
of a corporation, in a matter outside the scope of his duties as
such to first examine its records.4 6
It was further stated in Curtis Land & Loan Co., that:
It certainly is not the practice of persons dealing with officers or
agents who assume to act for such entities to insist on being
shown the resolution of the board of directors authorizing the
particular officer or agent to4 7 transact the particular business
which he assumes to conduct.

The decision seems to disregard this development and place an intolerable burden upon corporations and the third parties who deal with them.
"Roberts v. Saukville Canning Co., 250 Wis. 112, 26 N.AA.2d 145 (1947);
Steven v. Hale-Haas Corp., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W.2d 768 (1946), Glenwood

Mfg. Co. v. Syme, 109 Wis. 355, 85 N.W. 432 (1901).

4 Supra note 6, at 224, 114 N.W.2d at 503, Justice Currie in his dissent stated,
"The result of this decision is to impugn the ability of both third parties and
members of a corporation to rely on acts of corporate officers. The social
utility of definitness of corporation action outweighs the utility of letting a
city utilize every significant flaw to avoid annexation."
46 St. Clair v. Rutledge, 115 Wis. 583, 92 N.W. 234 (1902).
4 Curtis Land & Loan Co. v. Interior Land Co., 137 Wis. 341, 118 N.W. 853
(1908).
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COMMENTS

The decision in the instant case may also have the effect of forcing
the small, closely held corporations to hold formal meetings as a matter
of fact. This added burden, when in fact there appears to be no abuse
in the area, is without justification.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Brown Deer case has created
a new problem in the field of corporate management. By its decision it
has added a new consideration to this already complicated field. In the
future a corporate executive who makes a decision for the corporation
must not only weigh each and every business factor which relates to
the problem and also the legal problems involved, but he must also decide whether or not the decision he is making is a political act. If it is,
he will subject this decision to third party scrutiny, will preclude corporations and third parties from relying upon the doctrines of apparent
authority and of ratification, and will have to acquire the approval of
the board of directors either by formal meeting or by informal action
under §180.91. Parties dealing with the corporation will also become
involved, because they will have the burden of establishing the authority
of the corporate officer with whom they are dealing in order to be able
to rely upon the corporate act.
The distinction between business and political acts appears to be a
new concept in the law of this state and elsewhere. The determination
must await further judicial opinion to clarify the extent of the decision
and its practical effect. It would seem beyond speculation, however, that,
in the future, corporate officers must get formal approval or informal
approval under §180.91 before they can commit the corporation in annexation proceedings.
The practical effect of the decision in the Brown Deer case is to
place the Evert Container Corporation in an undesired municipality and
to force a majority of the population within the area of the annexation
attempt into that municipality against their precise wishes.
EDMUND C. CARNS

